Abstract The paper analyzes strategic behavior in a two-stage environmental choice problem under di¤erent information scenarios. Given uncertainty about environmental loss and irreversibility of development, "learning without destroying" emerges from strategic competition when information is endogenous and publicly available. This happens since agents trade o¤ the higher payo¤ of being the …rst-mover against the potentially free acquisition of endogenous information without developing their own environmental endowment. We prove that in a 2X2 dynamic environmental game with payo¤ uncertainty and irreversibility publicly available endogenous information could lead players to destroy less with respect to the case in which information is exogenous.
Introduction
The issue of irreversibility and uncertainty in environmental decisions has been studied extensively over the last three decades. Starting with the …rst de…nition of the QuasiOption Value by Arrow and Fisher (1974) , the key concepts of this …eld have been developed and re…ned in several articles by , Dasgupta and Heal (1979) , Hanemann (1982 Hanemann ( , 1989 , Fisher and Krutilla (1985) , Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal (1996) , Fisher (2000) , Pindyck (2000) . Arrow and Fisher's (1974) idea of the "quasi-option value" was originally tied to the optimal level of development of natural resources. The concept emerged from a twoperiod model of choice (develop or preserve), where development is irreversible and the expected net bene…ts of preservation in future periods are conditional upon the choice in the original period. Fisher and Hanemann (1987) use a similar theoretical framework as Arrow and Fisher (1974) . The main assumptions are the risk neutrality of the Decision M aker (henceforth DM ), irreversibility of the action "development", uncertainty about future pro…ts and costs (of development and preservation) and independent learning (exogenous information): the DM can receive new information about the environmental asset (about the future pro…ts and costs of his action) only by letting time pass; the acquisition of information (about preservation and development bene…ts in the second period) is thus independent from the choice made in the …rst period, i.e. it is exogenous.
Almost all other theoretical papers in the environmental literature analyzing decision problems share these basic features. Each of them mainly identi…es and studies the importance (in terms of preservation outcomes) of quasi-option value for di¤erent environmental problems. Following the intuition of Epstein (1980) and Miller and Lad (1984) , Attanasi and Montesano (2006) depart from Arrow and Fisher's model by introducing a second type of option value -the T esting V alue -to the analysis. The testing value emerges in all those situations in which the level of information concerning future economic pro…ts of development (and its future environmental costs) depends on the level of development carried out. They stress the fact that for a large number of environmental problems the possibility of acquiring new information is endogenous, i.e. depending on the level of development chosen by the DM:In the case of oil extraction in one country, for example, there may be uncertainty as to whether and where the land contains oil in commercial quantities. If this is the case, it is likely that the uncertainty can be solved by investing in development. The authors show that whenever information is revealed through development of the natural resource, the level of information avail-able must depend on the level of development carried out. More precisely, the level of information must be inversely related to the level of preservation of the environmental resource in the current period. Under these assumptions, Attanasi and Montesano (2006) show that the inclusion of the testing value in the Arrow and Fisher (1974) two-period model of choice generally pushes the decision maker towards a higher level of preservation of the environmental resource. This is the case since the testing value (which can be identi…ed as to the conditional value of endogenous information) leads the DM to develop only a certain amount of the environmental asset in the current period (internal solutions). On the contrary, Quasi-Option Value (which can be identi…ed as to the conditional value of exogenous information) frequently lead to corner solutions in the current period (preserve everything or destroy everything) As a result, the preservation of the economic resource in the …rst period induces the DM to destroy less in the future. This result is obtained under the assumption that the choice set is continuous, i.e. DM can develop a percentage between 0% and 100% of the environmental resource. If the choice set is dichotomous, the standard results apply and the Testing value is always zero.
In this paper we extend the basic idea of Attanasi and Montesano (2006) to interactive strategic settings. We show that in such settings endogenous information can play a role in leading players to preserve their own environmental asset even though each player's set of possible actions is restricted to Preserve or Destroy the whole environmental resource. The tendency to preserve in the current period occurs only when endogenous information, once revealed, is publicly available, so that a player can obtain endogenous information even preserving his own resources, if his opponent chooses to develop her resource. In the oil extraction example, our conclusion imply: consider two countries, each of them owning an environmental area with the same features of that owned by the other. Assume that when one of them decides to drill his own land in the current period, the results of the study will be immediately publicly available, so that both countries will know their actual oil resources. Therefore, one of the two countries could pro…t by the costless information generated by the other's choices and preserving more in the current period with respect to the case in which information would have been exogenous. Consider another example, which better matches the hypothesis of our model: there are two tropical islands. The distance between them is only a few miles and they are very similar from a morphological point of view. Both of them can constantly observe the consequences of the environmental and economic choices of their neighbor. Suppose that one of them undergoes some kind of touristic development, while the other chooses to preserve its original environmental features. Suppose also that after some years the former island realizes at its own expenses (hence endogenously) that, as a consequence of the touristic development, has lost a signi…cant share of its natural value. The latter observes other island's environmental loss linked to the undertaken development and thereby chooses to continue to preserve its environmental endowment. That example, among several others we do not mention here, gives rise to the following intuition: in a dynamic environmental development game, the possibility of publicly available endogenous information leads one of the two countries to preserve its own environmental resource in the current period, while, if information would have been (only) exogenous, both players could have chosen to fully exploit their natural resources in the …rst period.
The main aim of this paper is to analyze the role that publicly available endogenous information could have on environmental preservation. More speci…cally, we want to state a precise set of conditions under which, in a 2X2 dynamic environmental game with payo¤ uncertainty and irreversibility, publicly available endogenous information could lead players to destroy less with respect to the case in which information is exogenous.
In the next section, we introduce a game-theoretic framework to formally describe and analyze environmental strategic situations where uncertainty and irreversibility play a relevant role. In Section 3, we separately analyze players' optimal behavior under di¤erent information scenarios. In Section 4, we provide an economic interpretation to our theoretical results.
The Model
There are two players i = A; B with a similar environmental resource. They have to decide simultaneously if to preserve (entirely) or destroy (entirely) their own environmental resource in each of two periods of choice. Bene…ts from the resource development in each period of choice are common knowledge among players: they both know that if a player decides to develop his own environmental resource while the other does not, his own economic pro…ts from development are higher with respect to the case in which both players decide to develop. In particular, if only one player chooses to develop in t, his pro…ts from development will be x > 0; if instead both players will choose to develop in t, their individual pro…ts from development will be 0 < y < x: We call x the one-side development pro…t and y the two-sides development pro…t.
The irreversibility assumption implies that if a player decides to develop his own resource in t = 1, he cannot preserve it in t = 2. Hence, if only one player chooses to develop in t = 1, his total pro…ts from development will be 2x in case the other player will continue to preserve in t = 2 and x + y in case the other player will choose to develop in t = 2. Moreover, if both players choose to develop in t = 1, their total individual pro…ts from development will be 2y, because none of them can preserve his own environmental resource in the second period: since development is irreversible, both sets of possible actions in t = 2 are represented by a singleton, with only the action "develop"inside.
Suppose also that environmental costs from development of own resource are uncertain in each period of choice, i.e. they are represented by a random variablec = (c l ; p l ; c h ; 1 p l ), with c l < c h (l = low; h = high) 3 . The environmental costs are linked to development, hence if a player decides to develop his own environmental resource in period t, he will be a¤ected by the environmental costs both in t and in all the following periods (if some), because of the irreversibility of the development. We assume that the realized value of the environmental costs is the same in each of the two periods, therefore if a player develops his own resource in t = 1 and the realized value of the environmental loss is c j , with j = l; h, he will undergo a total environmental loss of 2c j ; if he preserve his own environmental resource in t = 1 and develop it in t = 2, he will undergo a total environmental loss of c j .
Optimal behavior under di¤erent information settings
When concentrating on the possible resolution of uncertainty (about the environmental loss) after t = 1; we specify four di¤erent information scenarios.
In the …rst one, no (additional) information is available after the …rst period of choice 4 .
In the second one, (only) exogenous information about the environmental costs of development is available (and it is common knowledge it will be available) with a given probability q 2 (0; 1] at the end of the …rst period, in su¢ cient time to be incorporated into the decision to be taken in the second (and last) period. Since the two environmental 4 One can interpret this information scenario in two ways: either information is not available (and it is common knowledge that it will be not available) in su¢ cient time to be incorporated into the second period 's choice or it is disregarded by the two players when they set the current and the future levels of development of their own environmental resource. resources are similar, the two players receive at the end of the …rst period the same kind and amount of exogenous information, i.e. they both know the true value ofc before choosing in t = 2:
In the third and in the fourth one, information about the environmental costs of development is (only) endogenous, i.e. a player knows the true value ofc at the end of period t = 1 (and so also in t = 2) if he decides to develop his own resources in that period. In the third information scenario endogenous information is private, so the only way for a player to know the true value of the potential environmental loss at the end of t = 1 (and so also in t = 2) is to choose to develop his own resources in that period. That means that every time he decides to receive (endogenous) information at the end of t = 1 he knows he cannot "choose" again in t = 2, because of irreversibility. In the fourth information scenario, instead, endogenous information, once coming out, is publicly available, so a player could know the true value of the environmental loss even preserving his own resources, if his opponent chooses to develop the one he holds. Therefore, in the last information scenario there are two ways through which one can obtain information at the end of t = 1 about the (present and future) environmental costs of development: one can develop her own resource in t = 1 or one can "wait" that her co-player develops her own t = 1. In this second case one can choose between P reserve and Develop in t = 2 after having known the true value of the environmental loss.
In the next subsections we study a 2-period dynamic game under the di¤erent information scenarios described above. It should be noted that the strategic setting described above cannot be represented as a symmetric 2-period repeated game between two riskneutral players,where the constituent game is simultaneous due to irreversibility. Every time a player chooses Develop in t = 1, his set of possible actions in t = 2 is "restricted" to fDevelopg, in that way being di¤erent from the same set in t = 1. Moreover, in each di¤erent information structure, the simultaneous game played in t = 2 presents a different payo¤ scheme. Hence, each information structure leads to a di¤erent supergame, with a di¤erent set of terminal histories.
Then, in each of the four cases, we …nd the set of S ubgame Perfect N ash E quilibria (SP N E, henceforth) of the dynamic game with imperfect information 5 , as a function of the parameter of the environmental problem, SP N E(x; y; p l ; c l ; c h ).
No Information
The environmental dynamic game with imperfect information is described in Figure 1 .
At the end of the …rst period, no information is revealed (nor exogenously nor endogenously), hence in all subgames after each action pro…le played in t = 1 players are in front to a payo¤ structure similar to that in t = 1. None of them knows the realized value of the environmental loss; the only di¤erence with respect to the game they have played in t = 1 is that the set of possible actions of each player who has chosen Develop in t = 1 is given only by the action Develop , i.e. that player cannot choose in t = 2:
Let us analyze players' optimal behavior under this information scenario, by describing qualitatively the set of all SP N E of the dynamic environmental game with imperfect information. We refer to Appendix I for a complete and detailed description of the backward induction procedure leading to each SP N E.
Players'optimal behavior in t = 2 depends on the expected value of the environmental loss.
When it is low, i.e. EV (c) 2 (0; y), action Develop is dominant for both players in each of the proper subgames of the decision tree; therefore each of them develops his own environmental resource in t = 2. Since the simultaneous game in t = 1 has the same payo¤ structure of the one played in t = 1, going backward, they both develop also in t = 1.
When the expected value of the environmental loss is high, i.e. EV (c) 2 (x; +1), action Preserve is dominant for both players in each of the proper subgames of the decision tree; therefore each of them preserves his own environmental resource in t = 2 if he has preserved it in t = 1, otherwise he is obliged to (continue) to choose Develop. Since the simultaneous game in t = 1 has the same payo¤ structure of the one played in t = 1, going backward, they both preserve also in t = 1. In the unique SP N E, both players choose P reserve in each period.
When the expected value of the environmental loss is between the one-side and the two-sides development pro…t, i.e. EV (c) 2 (y; x), there are not dominant actions in each of the proper subgames of the decision tree. In particular, in each subgame reached after one of the two players has chosen Develop in t = 1, the other player chooses to (continue) to preserve, because the two-sides development pro…t is lower than EV (c).
Once going backward to t = 1, we realize that in each pure strategy SP N E there is one player preserving his own resources in t = 1 and in t = 2 and the other developing his own in t = 1 (and so also in t = 2).
We summarize in T able 1 the SP N E paths under the no information scenario, as function of the parameters of the game. In the table, the symbol a t i stands for the action chosen by player i in period t, for i = A; B and t = 1; 2.
[T able 1 HERE]
Exogenous Information
At the end of the …rst period, with probability q 2 [0; 1], the two players "receive" the true value of the environmental loss in both periods of choice, independently from the action pro…le played in t = 1. Hence exogenous information arrival is not "certain": it is revealed with a given probability, which is common knowledge among players.
We graphically represent this situation in Figure 2 , by supposing that after t = 1 there are two consecutive moves of "N ature"
6 : the …rst move determines whether information is revealed or not. If information is revealed, there is a second move of the N ature, indicating to both players the true value of the environmental loss. Therefore, for each action pro…le in t = 1 there are four proper subgames: in the …rst one, players interact without knowing the true state of the world (N ature does not play any more); in the second one, N ature moves …rst by indicating the true state of the world; after this move, we have the other two subgames: in each of them both players know the true value ofc.
[F igure 2 HERE]
Let us analyze players'optimal behavior under this information scenario, by describing qualitatively the set of all SP N E of the dynamic environmental game with imperfect information. We refer to Appendix II for a complete and detailed description of the backward induction procedure leading to each SP N E.
In each of the subgames where no new information is revealed, players' optimal behavior is similar to that under the "no information scenario". In each of the subgames following the revelation of new information, players'choice depends on the true value of the environmental loss, which they can observe before choosing in t = 2: Several SP N E (in both pure and mixed strategies) exist. Let us analyze only the subcases which di¤er with respect to the "no information"scenario in terms of players'behavior in t = 1:
-when the expected value of the environmental loss is low, i.e. EV (c) 2 (0; y) and c h is at least greater than y, it is possible that, for low values of p l , at least one player chooses to Preserve his own resources in t = 1, while under the "no information"scenario both players would develop in t = 1. This is reasonable: now players have the possibility to observe (without any e¤ort) the true value of the environmental loss before choosing in t = 2. Hence, even though the expected value of the environmental loss is very low, they prefer preserving in t = 1, because the "bad"state of the world is highly likely and the loss in that case would also be considerable.
-when EV (c) 2 (y; x), c l 2 (0; y) and c h 2 (x; +1), it is possible that, for low values of p l , both players choose to Preserve their own resources in t = 1, while under the "no information"scenario only one player would preserve in t = 1. This is again reasonable: even though the low environmental loss is even lower than the two-sides development pro…t, it is really unlikely to be the true one. The high environmental loss, which in this case is even higher than the one-side development pro…t, is highly likely, hence both players prefer to wait in t = 1 to know the true value of the environmental loss before t = 2; than, in that period they would both choose Preserve if they learn that c h is the true value and they would both Develop otherwise.
All possible SP N E paths under the exogenous information scenarios, as function of the parameters of the game, are summarized in Table 2 .
[T able 2 HERE]
Endogenous "Private" Information
Similarly to the previous case, it is not possible to represent the strategic setting as a 2-period repeated game. This is so not only because of irreversibility, but also because the payo¤s of the simultaneous game in t = 2 are endogenous due to their dependence on the choices made by the two players in t = 1. In particular, looking at F igure 3, since endogenous information is available to a player only if he chooses to develop in t = 1, there will be asymmetric information in two of the four proper subgames of the dynamic game. More precisely, in the subgame generated by the action pro…le (a 1 A ; a 1 B ) = (Preserve, Preserve), none of the two players knows the true value of the environmental lossc. In the subgame generated by the action pro…le (a 1 A ; a 1 B ) = (Develop, Develop); both players know the true value ofc. In the subgame generated by the action pro…les In these two subgames the player obtaining endogenous information (the one choosing Develop in t = 1) cannot "exploit"it in order to make a better choice (for him) with respect to the "no information"scenario due to the irreversibility assumption. The other player (the one who has preserved in t = 1) has in t = 2 the same information he had in t = 1, hence he acts as in the "no information"scenario.
Therefore, independently from the expected value of the environmental loss, players'optimal behavior under the "private endogenous information"scenario is similar to that under the "no information" one. In fact we …nd the same set of SP N E for the dynamic environmental game, whose equilibrium paths are summarized in Table 3 (we refer to Appendix III for a complete and detailed description of the backward induction procedure leading to each SP N E).
[T able 3 HERE]

Endogenous "Public" Information
Once again, we cannot represent the strategic setting as a 2-period repeated game, because payo¤ pro…les in t = 2 are endogenous. As can be seen in F igure 4 in case at least one of them chooses to develop in t = 1; information in t = 2 will be symmetric in all cases and both players choose knowing the true value ofc in all proper subgames, apart the one generated by the action pro…le (a 1 A ; a 1 B ) = (Preserve, Preserve).since endogenous information is available to both players.
[F igure 4 HERE]
Let us analyze players'optimal behavior under this information scenario, by describing qualitatively the set of all SP N E of the dynamic environmental game with imperfect information. We refer to Appendix IV for a complete and detailed description of the backward induction procedure leading to each SP N E.
Again several SP N E (in both pure and mixed strategies) exist. We summarize the pure strategy equilibrium path in Table 4 .
[T able 4 HERE]
Let us analyze only the subcases which di¤er, in terms of players'behavior in t = 1, with respect to the other scenarios.
With respect to the "no information" scenario (and so also to the "private endogenous"one), when the expected value of the environmental loss is low, i.e. EV (c) 2 (0; y) and c h is at least greater than y, it is possible that, for low values of p l , one player chooses to Preserve his own resources in t = 1, while under the "no information"scenario both players would develop in t = 1. This happens because the player choosing Preserve in t = 1 prefers receiving the costless information, thanks to his opponent's choosing Develop in t = 1. In that way, the former can choose in t = 2 after having learned the true value of the environmental loss. The latter instead play on the …rst-mover advantage, which is able to compensate the potential loss in both periods. In e¤ect, the worst it could happen to him is thatc = c h , but in this case he is sure that his total development pro…t will be 2x, because the other player, having received public endogenous information, does not develop in t = 2 ifc = c h .
Let us now compare the theoretical results under public endogenous information to those under exogenous information. One could reasonably expect that, when information is exogenous, since it is not necessary to develop in order to learn, both players would preserve more with respect to the case in which information is endogenous (and publicly available). What instead happens in our framework is that, under certain conditions, the aggregate preservation level is higher under public endogenous information than under the exogenous one.
More speci…cally, when the expected value of the environmental loss is low (EV (c) 2 (0; y)) but c h is quite high (at least greater than y) and highly likely (p l low), i.e.
then under the exogenous information scenario both players develop in t = 1, while, when information is endogenous and publicly available, only one player develops in t = 1 and the other preserves in t = 1 (he develops in t = 2 only if the true value of environmental loss is c l ).
This result holds 8q 2 (0; 1], hence even in case the probability of exogenously receiving new information after t = 1 is very high (near to 1). As q increases, however, the interval of p l values for which "public" endogenous information leads to (a Let us compare the (optimal) expected payo¤ of the two players under the two di¤erent equilibrium paths. We obtain, for player i
and for player i
Hence, both players obtain a higher payo¤ in the public endogenous information case. 7 The constraint that arises from the condition E(c) < y , i.e. p l (c h c l ) > c h y, does not restrict the interval indicated in (1).
According to Attanasi and Montesano (2006) , this increase in players'optimal payo¤ measures the Testing value (henceforth TV ), i.e. the additional gain that a decision maker obtains when he can receive information regarding future bene…ts, by developing in the current period (with respect to the case in which he ignores the possibility of receiving information in this way). The T V has to be interpreted as the additional value attached to endogenous information, additional with respect to information exogenously arriving. Therefore it can be calculated as the di¤erence between the expected bene…ts in case of certain endogenous information and the expected bene…ts in the uncertain exogenous information case 8 :
T V is always nonnegative: it is positive when the preservation level is higher with (public) endogenous information with respect to the "no information case"; it is null when the preservation level under the two information scenarios is the same 9 ; it would be negative if in some cases a player would preserve more under the no information scenario with respect to the (public or private) endogenous one. However, Attanasi and Montesano (2006) prove that it cannot happen in any case.
A counterintuitive result is that in the subcase considered T V is higher for the player who decided to Develop in the current period with respect to the one who decided to P reserve. This happens because the increase in the optimal payo¤ passing from the "exogenous information" to the "public endogenous information" case is higher for the player who chooses to develop in both periods under both information scenarios. But according to Attanasi and Montesano (2006) , T V has to be null for a decision maker who makes the same choice under the two di¤erent information scenarios, when this choice is "Develop entirely the environmental resource". The explanation is the following: T V 8 Attanasi and Montesano (2006) show that T V could be calculated in two ways: -as an additional value of endogenous to exogenous information; -as a value emerging in the particular information context in which only endogenous information is available.
They prove that in case the utility function would be linear (and in our case it is), the two de…nitions of the Testing value coincide.
9 For example, in our framework, the Testing value coming from private endogenous information is always equal to 0, since for both players the optimal "preservation level"under this information scenario is always equal to the one obtained when information is not available.
has been de…ned by Attanasi and Montesano (2006) in a decision theoretic environment, hence without considering interactive strategic situations; by construction, in their model they do not contemplate the possibility that endogenous information could be costlessly "transferred" to another player once acquired. This transmission could prevent the "receiving" player from choosing Develop in t = 1, thus "leaving" the other with the one-side development pro…t in t = 1.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the role of publicly available endogenous information in motivating risk neutral decision makers towards preservation of their own environmental resource in an interactive strategic setting. More speci…cally, we have analyzed strategic behavior in a two-stage environmental choice problem with uncertainty about environmental loss and irreversibility of development. In order to correctly understand the e¤ects of the possible resolution of uncertainty (about the environmental loss) after t = 1 on players'economic and environmental choices, we have speci…ed four di¤erent information scenarios.
First of all, it can be easily shown that endogenous information, if only privately available to the player choosing to develop his own resources in the current period, has no e¤ects in terms of players'behavior with respect to the standard case where no new information is disclosed between the two choice periods. This is because the player endogenously obtaining information, once developed in t = 1, cannot "exploit" this new information in t = 2, because he is constrained to develop also in t = 2. Hence, under this information scenario, choosing to develop in t = 1 only because of learning considerations, is always ine¢ cient and so rational players do not take it into account. Thus they choose to develop in t = 1 under the same conditions they would do it in the standard "no information"scenario.
When instead endogenous information is publicly available (i.e. both players receive new information if at least one of them has chosen to develop in t = 1) "learning without destroying" emerges from strategic competition. This happens since agents trade o¤ the higher payo¤ of being the …rst-mover against the potentially free acquisition of endogenous information without developing their own environmental endowment.
With respect to the "no information" scenario (and so also to the "private endogenous" one), when the environmental loss is highly likely but its expected value is low, one player chooses to Preserve his own resources in the current period under the "pub-lic endogenous information" scenario, while under the "no information" scenario both players would develop in t = 1. Even more surprisingly, under the same conditions (environmental loss is highly likely, but its expected value is low) both players would develop in the current period also under the "endogenous information scenario". That means we have found a set of conditions under which publicly available endogenous information leads players to destroy less (in aggregate terms) with respect to the case in which information is (only) exogenous. Under these conditions, the cost of endogenous information is low, so one of the two players develops in the current period and the other chooses Preserve thus receiving the new costless information, thanks to his opponent's choice. In that way, the latter can choose in t = 2 after having learned the true value of the environmental loss. The former instead plays on the …rst-mover advantage, which is able to compensate the potential loss in both periods of choice.
A last counterintuitive result is that, when public endogenous information is "economically convenient", the increase in the optimal payo¤ passing from the "exogenous information" to the "public endogenous information" scenario is higher for the player who chooses to develop in the current period under both information scenarios. This increase is precisely measured for both players by the Testing value, i.e. the conditional value attached to endogenous information, additional with respect to information exogenously arriving. 
